A newly disclosed Windows technique called FastUnlock can let someone with physical access start programs from a locked computer without signing in, The Hacker News reported, citing testing by endpoint-security firm ThreatLocker. The demonstrated access uses a limited account rather than administrator privileges, but means a locked screen alone may not prevent someone holding the device from running software.
The technique requires both physical access and a Microsoft account reachable through the lock screen’s recovery options. Those conditions make accessible laptops, shared workstations and front-counter computers relevant concerns. No official affected-version list has been published, so machines meeting those conditions should be treated as potentially affected.
At the time of the report, Microsoft had not released a fix, and there was no evidence of the technique being used in a real attack.
What ThreatLocker tested
The researcher using the handles MSNightmare and Nightmare Eclipse disclosed FastUnlock the day before The Hacker News report. ThreatLocker tested it on the day of disclosure and found it worked, the report said.
The method uses Narrator, Windows’ built-in screen reader, to navigate the locked screen through recovery options. In its test, ThreatLocker reached a point where it could launch a program under an account it identified as WSIAccount, which it described as “not an administrator account.”
The researcher’s GitHub disclosure consists of a short post and video with little written explanation. ThreatLocker’s test therefore provides the clearest reported account of the demonstrated behavior: program execution from the lock screen with limited permissions.
Why BitLocker may not stop it
BitLocker, Windows’ drive-encryption feature, does not necessarily prevent this technique. The distinction is when the drive becomes accessible.
Microsoft’s TPM documentation explains that suitable hardware supports a “TPM-only” BitLocker configuration, in which the Trusted Platform Module—a hardware security component that protects encryption keys—allows startup without a PIN or USB key. Once the computer reaches the Windows lock screen, its system drive has already been unlocked through the normal startup process.
For example, a laptop configured to start directly at the Windows sign-in screen can have BitLocker enabled while still presenting the conditions FastUnlock needs. The technique operates after the drive unlocks; it does not crack BitLocker encryption or recover its key. The demonstrated program still runs with the limited account’s permissions.
A BitLocker startup PIN adds authentication before Windows starts and before the system drive becomes accessible. That differs from relying on the Windows sign-in screen after startup. It also means a startup PIN cannot protect a machine already running at that screen.
What administrators can do now
Organizations should control physical access to potentially exposed devices, particularly laptops that could go missing and computers reachable by visitors. For sensitive machines, the report recommends adding a BitLocker startup PIN and shutting down or hibernating devices before they leave an authorized user’s control.
Those measures align with Microsoft’s BitLocker countermeasures guidance, which recommends TPM with a PIN, disabling standby power management, and shutdown or hibernation for protection against skilled attackers with extended physical access. Microsoft also recommends that combination for secure administrative workstations.
Sleep and hibernation have different consequences here. Microsoft explains that sleep retains running programs and documents in memory and does not require another BitLocker PIN or startup key when the device wakes. Hibernation locks the drive; a device configured with a startup PIN requires it again on resume. Hibernation alone does not add that authentication to TPM-only configurations.
Administrators adopting a startup PIN should account for the operational tradeoff: someone must enter it after a reboot or resume from hibernation, which can complicate unattended updates and remote administration. While awaiting an official fix or advisory, prioritize physical control and startup protection on exposed machines, then apply Microsoft’s fix when available.




