Hunt.io traces account theft operation across 603 Windows PCs

Hunt.io traces account theft operation across 603 Windows PCs

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Hunt.io traces account theft operation across 603 Windows PCs
Malware

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Banking, government and workplace accounts were exposed through a credential-theft operation affecting 603 Windows PCs, Hunt.io found, as Security Affairs reported on November 20, 2026. The stolen material included readable passwords, decrypted password-manager vaults and sessions that could provide access to accounts. The compromise occurred on users’ computers; the banks and government agencies themselves were not breached.

Hunt.io discovered the operation’s stolen-data repository in an openly accessible directory on a Netherlands-based virtual private server. Among those affected, at least 57 victims had US bank or government credentials on their computers, while 46 had accounts associated with federal benefits or identity services. The exposed access included accounts behind ID.me and Login.gov, gateways used to verify identities for government services.

The findings also extend to corporate Microsoft 365 environments, software developers and cryptocurrency users. In two Microsoft 365 tenants—separate organizational environments—the operator used stolen session information to obtain access without a new login or multifactor authentication prompt.

From browser passwords to entire vaults

The recovered browser data contained at least 3,345 decrypted login records, including plaintext passwords. Those records came from Chrome and Edge databases on 15 hosts across 16 identified victims. Hunt.io also described 30 cookie database files and JSON-format cookie exports collected from multiple victims. Cookies can preserve an authenticated session, making them useful for accessing an account after its owner has signed in.

The report says the operator defeated Chrome’s newer app-bound encryption, which ties protected data to the application, using hardcoded AES-GCM encryption keys for Chrome versions 20 and 21. Another script sifted through stolen cookies for 28 services, among them Google, Anthropic, Binance, PayPal and several banks.

Password-manager vaults offered a different route to large collections of secrets. For LastPass, the operator assembled seven scripts to crack the vault’s AES-CBC encrypted storage offline. One vault yielded 2,880 logins, with access to a bank account and the IRS among the recovered material, as well as the vault’s own sharing key. The haul also contained 17 passkeys and secure notes holding Wi-Fi passwords and security answers.

Two victims’ 1Password master passwords were cracked through a keyset attack involving PBKDF2, HKDF and AES-GCM, technologies used to derive cryptographic keys and encrypt data. In another case, the operator took a developer’s live KeePass database from a GoLand workstation while KeePass was open.

These cases illustrate the breadth of access available from a compromised computer: a single stolen vault could expose thousands of logins across unrelated services.

Existing sessions opened further accounts

For Microsoft 365, the operator exploited stolen ESTSAUTHPERSISTENT session cookies. Replaying a PKCE OAuth flow—an authorization exchange used to obtain access tokens—produced live Microsoft Graph API tokens, credentials for accessing Microsoft services programmatically. The process did not trigger a login or multifactor authentication prompt. Hunt.io reported two tenants compromised this way, and a reconnaissance log recorded the operator surveying accounts and installed software on a corporate host.

Developer tools were another collection target. Four PowerShell scripts stole session tokens from 35 AI development tools, including Claude, Codex and Gemini, alongside credential files, chat histories and API keys, which software uses to authenticate to services.

Cryptocurrency collection used three additional scripts. These targeted 44 platforms and seven browser wallet extensions, taking 6,570 records from 67 victims.

Custom control tools and persistent remote access

The 603 compromised computers had contacted three command-and-control systems, infrastructure that directs infected devices, since October 12. They generated more than 1.2 million connections over three weeks.

Hunt.io described a platform built from scratch around three custom components. HavoX provided command execution and communications with infected machines through encrypted connections and hidden Python scripts. Phantom53 kept track of victims and their tasks. Kraken Bridge linked the platform to an external control panel, passing commands and distributing tasks through temporary download links that were deleted after use.

The operator supplemented that infrastructure with legitimate remote-access products, including ConnectWise ScreenConnect and Level.io. An integrated Level.io installer provided a way to retain access even after the original malware was removed.

Hunt.io’s characterization of the operator as Russian-speaking rests on language found throughout 249 files. Russian comments, logs and documentation strings appeared in material ranging from a bridge component’s runtime log to a script searching for cryptocurrency seed phrases, the secrets used to recover wallets.

For defenders, Hunt.io recommends protecting AI command-line tool credential files as carefully as SSH keys used for remote access, and alerting when pythonw.exe starts from unusual locations. Administrators should also apply conditional access based on device state, the researchers advise.

The account response matters alongside device cleanup. Hunt.io recommends phishing-resistant authentication, binding sessions to devices, and prompt resets for customers whose credentials appear in the stolen material.

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