Signal adds mobile screen blocks to limit AI access to chats

Signal adds mobile screen blocks to limit AI access to chats

Add CyberWorldOpsto your preferred sources on Google
Signal adds mobile screen blocks to limit AI access to chats
AI

Illustrative image generated with AI

Signal is adding screen-capture restrictions to prevent operating-system AI assistants from reading private conversations on supported iPhones and Android devices. In its announcement, the messaging service says the protection also limits users’ ability to take screenshots, while leaving other potential routes for AI access unresolved.

The controls cover Signal 8.37 or later on iPhones running iOS 27 or later, and Signal 8.35.1 or later on Android. On iPhone, “Block Siri AI” is enabled by default. On Android, Signal automatically enables “Screen security” when it first detects an AI assistant trying to read the screen and displays an explanation. Signal cautions that its detection approach cannot cover every Android device.

The change matters to anyone whose device has an AI assistant with access to screen content, including Google Gemini and Siri AI. Signal says such access increasingly comes enabled by default and can occur without a clear indication to the user. Capturing one person’s screen can expose messages from everyone participating in that conversation.

Why screen access changes the privacy boundary

Signal says operating-system AI agents scan displayed information to answer questions and perform tasks. Once they capture Signal content, that data can enter a local database or remote server outside the messaging app’s control. The company describes these integrations as an “existential threat” to its ability to uphold its privacy guarantees independently.

The screen controls do not change Signal’s message encryption. They address access to content displayed on a device, where an assistant can read an already visible conversation.

While enabled, the controls block screenshots and screen recordings inside Signal, hide its content in Android’s recent-apps view or the iPhone App Switcher, and prevent on-device AI assistants from reading its screen, the company’s support guidance says.

Signal previously used screenshot blocking on Windows 11 to prevent Microsoft Recall from capturing its messages by default. Signal describes Recall as taking screenshots every few seconds, extracting text through optical character recognition—software that reads text from images—and placing it in a searchable on-device database. That could retain sensitive content, including disappearing messages.

The mobile protection has limits. Blocking screenshots does not prevent an agent from retrieving content already stored on a device through its filesystem, Signal says. Android also varies across manufacturers: on many devices, Signal cannot reliably detect attempted screenshots once screenshots are disabled. It therefore focuses on detecting an assistant’s attempt to access the screen and enabling protection at that point, rather than disabling screenshots without an explanation.

Other permissions can expose messages

The Hacker News reported, citing Reuters, that Meta’s Muse agent had accessed Signal messages on an Apple computer and an Android device through broad permissions granted during setup, bypassing its official “Connector” tool.

On macOS, the agent reportedly used accessibility and screenshot tools to open Signal, capture images, extract their text and reproduce the content inside Muse. On Android, it read messages through access to push notifications.

In one example described in that reporting, Muse reminded a Meta employee using her personal phone to answer a Signal message from her sister. The employee wrote internally that she did not recall granting access to other apps or being asked about it.

Signal separately calls for controls over third-party agents such as Muse, arguing that accessibility permissions intended to help people use applications can give agents broad access to application data.

The company says developers need a documented way to exclude their applications entirely from AI access and processing, covering screen reading, filesystems, notifications, application programming interfaces and other operating-system frameworks without sacrificing core functions. It also wants clearer specifications explaining how agents access and process data. Signal says it has spent months investigating Android and iOS behavior because that documentation is lacking.

Confidential computing approaches are insufficient, Signal argues, because they still leave operating-system providers deciding the extent of privacy guarantees. The company says Google and Apple are engaging with it on how their systems should interact with privacy-sensitive apps.

Where users can control access

On Android, users can enable protection immediately under Settings → Privacy → App security → Screen security. With it enabled, the phone refuses screenshots inside Signal and also enables the setting that hides Signal in the app-switching view.

On iPhone, the control is under Settings → Privacy → Block Siri AI. Users can leave it on, turn it off, or select Off for 10 Minutes, which automatically restores protection afterward. An attempted screenshot produces a message with an Options button offering those choices.

Signal asks for confirmation before disabling protection because assistants may then scan chat content and use it for features that may not be private. On iOS, disabling it produces no subsequent reminder; hiding chats in the App Switcher remains available through a separate setting.

On Android, manually switching off Screen security in Settings also produces no reminder. If users instead disable it through the “Turn off screen security” prompt, Signal enables it again after 90 days.

Mac users face a different limitation. Signal says it cannot reliably block screenshots on macOS with the available, clearly documented tools. Existing continuous-screen-capture protections cannot be applied to screenshots, while some replacement interfaces protect only streaming media and other digital-rights-managed content.

The Hacker News also reported that Apple added an “Excluded Apps” option in iOS 27.2 late last month to control access by Siri, Search and suggestions, and that Gemini users can disconnect apps through Connected Apps settings. Apple previewed more granular Mac data-access controls earlier in the week of that report.

For macOS 27 users, Signal’s current recommendation is to add Signal to System Settings → Siri → Excluded Apps to protect message content from proactive access by Siri AI.

Security dossiers

Read next

Sources

Back to home

Latest Cybersecurity News

All cybersecurity news →