Blackpoint links ROMULUS ClickFix attacks to CNCMachineRMS

Blackpoint links ROMULUS ClickFix attacks to CNCMachineRMS

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Blackpoint links ROMULUS ClickFix attacks to CNCMachineRMS
Malware

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Blackpoint Cyber has identified CNCMachineRMS as the remote access trojan delivered by one branch of the ROMULUS malware platform, connecting previously separate research into malicious software installers. In its technical report, the company said the malware supports persistent access, surveillance and additional payload execution, putting compromised business and managed service provider environments at risk of further intrusion.

The attacks use ClickFix, a technique that tricks people into running commands under the guise of completing a verification check or fixing a problem. Blackpoint tracked a high volume of this activity beginning in late September 2026, including installers impersonating Canon and Stardock applications. Its researchers observed ROMULUS delivering CNCMachineRMS and LegionLoader through separate infection chains.

CNCMachineRMS can control a desktop remotely, stream the screen, capture microphone and camera input, manage files and collect system information. It communicates with attacker infrastructure through DNS over HTTPS, which carries DNS traffic inside encrypted web connections. Blackpoint said it had observed no post-exploitation activity despite those capabilities.

Connecting the previously unnamed implant

Blackpoint researchers Sam Decker, Nevan Beal and Andi Ursry assessed with high confidence that the previously unnamed trojan in ROMULUS’s Stardock delivery chain is CNCMachineRMS. Their evidence included a matching payload SHA-256 fingerprint, family-specific strings and matching internal storage structures, alongside similarities in scripting and execution routines.

That identification connects several investigations. As recounted in Blackpoint’s report, Huntress published research on September 28 documenting ChatGPT Custom GPTs directing users toward malicious installers that ultimately delivered an unidentified trojan. Forescout’s Vedere Labs followed on October 15, connecting infrastructure used by the Stardock chain to ROMULUS and identifying its separate LegionLoader route.

LevelBlue SpiderLabs had documented CNCMachineRMS in August as the final payload of a BabaDeda infection chain. The Hacker News also reported that BabaDeda delivery used ClickFix and a legitimately signed IBM SPSS IDE executable for DLL sideloading. Blackpoint’s findings support shared tooling across the BabaDeda and ROMULUS ecosystems, without establishing a shared or connected operator.

Blackpoint assesses that ROMULUS likely operates as a delivery service, retaining ClickFix and signed-binary sideloading techniques while distributing different payloads.

How the Stardock installer launches the malware

One installer Blackpoint analyzed, IconEdit2Turb.msi, arrived through an obfuscated PowerShell command that downloaded it, removed its Mark of the Web—the marker identifying an internet-downloaded file—and silently executed it with msiexec.exe. The download infrastructure also used decimal IP notation, representing addresses as numbers.

The installer impersonated Stardock Smart DeElevation Tool and placed its files under %LOCALAPPDATA%\Programs\Stardock Smart DeElevation Tool\. It set ARPSYSTEMCOMPONENT=1 to hide from conventional installed-program listings, then used a WixShellExec installation action to launch the legitimate, digitally signed DeElevate64.exe.

The attackers left that executable intact. Instead, they modified its companion library, DeElevator64.dll, to load another library, I++u.dll. This is DLL sideloading: malicious code runs through a library loaded by a legitimate application. Here, Windows loaded the altered companion library and its malicious dependency inside the signed Stardock process.

I++u.dll then read an encrypted payload from Build.dat, which resembled a Microsoft System.Net.Http NuGet software package. The malicious content was hidden within the compressed data of an existing package entry, rather than added as a separate file.

Blackpoint reconstructed a position-dependent XOR decryption routine and recovered approximately 341 KB of x64 shellcode, low-level executable instructions. The loader used senddmp.resources.dll and the Windows VirtualAlloc function to allocate executable memory, then invoked the shellcode through the callback mechanism of EnumSystemCodePagesW.

The next stage accessed execute_engine_disconnect.raw, a custom storage file containing resources for the final implant. Its metadata used arithmetic obfuscation, while file contents used a separate bytewise XOR routine. Blackpoint rebuilt the parser and extracted 1,128 entries—315 directories and 813 files—without executing the malware. That storage format, together with the custom scripting engine and identifiers recovered from the implant, helped establish the CNCMachineRMS connection.

ClickFix spreads across other delivery routes

The Hacker News placed the findings alongside several other ClickFix campaigns. One combined ClickFix with EtherHiding, which retrieves malicious instructions through blockchain infrastructure, across more than 70,000 compromised websites. JavaScript queried a Polygon smart contract for additional code that displayed a fake Cloudflare CAPTCHA and ultimately delivered malware identified as slaiclind. Another used fake Zillow apartment-review pages to install NetSupport RAT on Windows computers.

A chain called TRUST#GRAFT injected JavaScript into WordPress sites through an unknown initial access method. It presented a fake Cloudflare check, fingerprinted visitors and checked for an authenticated WordPress administrator browser before uploading a malicious PHP plugin called Web Media Optimizer. The plugin could inject remote JavaScript into public pages and copy itself into the mu-plugins directory for persistence.

Search advertising supplied other entry points. A sponsored Google result for “amazon business” led to a spoofed Amazon login page whose ClickFix command used Windows’ built-in finger utility, eventually deploying NetSupport Client and a Lumma Stealer variant. Google Ads also directed users to an Anthropic Claude shared chat staging a fake download page that delivered Atomic macOS Stealer through Terminal commands. A separate campaign, dubbed Adception, routed searches for “claude mac” through Bing and a compromised retail website to an InstallFix lure on another fake Claude download page.

Other reported chains used a “House Wiring Scheme” lure and clipboard manipulation to retrieve Python payloads through DNS TXT records, including CrocoRat and tools targeting browser data, credentials, cryptocurrency wallets and seed phrases. Phone callers directed targets to compromised WordPress sites delivering trojanized installers impersonating 3D PDF Maker Smart, Bitwarden VPN and ESET Sysinspector. STAC4924 used a TerminalFix prompt to deploy a Python tunneling implant through Lorem Ipsum Loader.

Fake Cloudflare checks on sites impersonating DMarket, Czech Microsoft Office authentication and UK retailer Howdens also delivered CrashHandler RAT and other remote access malware, including one using the Stripe API to receive instructions and return stolen information. The outlet cited Huntress research published the previous week describing ClickFix chains supporting persistence, lateral movement, reconnaissance and credential theft, including malware reconstructed from browser-cache content or data hidden in PNG images.

What defenders should investigate

Blackpoint recommends focusing on recurring behavior across changing installers: PowerShell downloads followed by silent MSI execution, signed applications loading altered libraries from user-writable directories, Registry Run entries paired with scheduled tasks, and DNS over HTTPS traffic from unexpected processes.

For this campaign, host indicators include the installation directory above, the Stardock DeElevation Tool value under HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run, and a scheduled task with the same name. The researchers also identified the family-specific directory CNCMachineRMS\tasks and payload filename task_payload.bin. Their report provides file hashes and network indicators for investigation.

Administrators should apply Blackpoint’s recommendations to restrict unauthorized installations and execution from untrusted locations, use application allowlisting, limit local administrator privileges, and enforce endpoint protection, behavioral monitoring and tamper protection. Network teams should apply DNS filtering and outbound controls and investigate unexpected encrypted DNS traffic. Users should receive explicit guidance on fake verification prompts that ask them to execute commands in PowerShell or Windows Run.

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