TeamPCP: From Redis Attacks to Supply Chain Compromise

Criminal Activity Dating Back to at Least 2020

An analysis by Oligo Security, published on August 7, 2026, links TeamPCP to cybercrime activity that began at least as early as 2020. The group may therefore have been active for years before its more recent software supply chain campaigns.

The link is based on overlaps in domains, backend infrastructure, malware distribution paths, staging techniques, and operating methods. However, Oligo has not determined whether this represents a direct rebranding, a shared group of operators, or collaboration between previously connected actors.

The group’s early activities reportedly targeted Internet-accessible systems running Redis, Ray, Docker, and React. In April 2020, Trend Micro had already documented a campaign targeting exposed Redis servers to distribute malware and cryptocurrency miners.

ShadowRay 2.0 and TA-NATALSTATUS

Two campaigns associated with the same operational ecosystem were observed during the second half of 2025.

The first, ShadowRay 2.0—also known as IronErn—targeted artificial intelligence infrastructure and turned it into a self-propagating botnet. The second, known as TA-NATALSTATUS, targeted exposed Redis servers to install mining software.

The correlation between GitHub and GitLab identities associated with IronErn and infrastructure later attributed to TeamPCP further strengthens the connection. Oligo compared GitLab authentication logs, reverse shell activity, command-and-control servers, and malware staging phases.

The actor also reportedly exploited known vulnerabilities in React, Docker, Redis, and Ray, combining automation with wormable techniques to accelerate propagation.

From Server Exploitation to the Supply Chain

The first public information about the actor emerged toward the end of last year in connection with Operation PCPcat. The campaign reportedly exploited vulnerabilities in React Server Components and Next.js to steal credentials and sensitive data.

At the beginning of this year, Flare described a broad campaign targeting cloud-native environments. Objectives included building proxy and scanning infrastructure, compromising servers, exfiltrating data, deploying ransomware, extortion, and cryptocurrency mining.

TeamPCP subsequently appears to have brought the same capabilities into the software supply chain through:

• compromising developer systems;
• poisoning widely used open-source libraries;
• abusing GitHub Actions;
• stealing and fraudulently using tokens;
• exploiting legitimate cloud infrastructure.

This evolution increases the risk for organizations that rely on automated pipelines and third-party packages.

kube.py and Destructive Behavior on Kubernetes

One of the tools observed is the Python script kube.py, used after Kubernetes environments were compromised. Early versions focused primarily on propagation and persistence.

Variants detected as recently as March 2026 instead include functionality resembling that of a wiper. The behavior depends on the system’s configured time zone:

• on Iranian Kubernetes clusters, it creates a DaemonSet that wipes every node using the Kamikaze wiper;
• on Kubernetes nodes outside Iran, it deploys the CanisterWorm backdoor;
• on non-Kubernetes systems in Iran, it executes poison_pill(), which is designed to erase the entire filesystem.

The potential impact therefore includes credential and data theft, cryptocurrency mining, ransomware, backdoors, and complete infrastructure destruction.

What Organizations Should Check

No specific patches, fixed versions, indicators of compromise, or YARA rules have been disclosed. Organizations should therefore focus their checks on the attack surfaces identified in the analysis:

• Redis, Ray, and Docker servers directly exposed to the Internet;
• Kubernetes clusters and anomalous DaemonSet activity;
• GitHub Actions and GitLab pipelines;
• tokens usable by automated systems;
• unexpected installation or modification of open-source packages;
• connections to command-and-control infrastructure;
• reverse shell processes and scripts such as kube.py;
• anomalous deletion of nodes, filesystems, or cloud resources.

The exact versions of the vulnerable products and specific remediation procedures are not known. Organizations should therefore maintain an up-to-date asset inventory, reduce Internet exposure, rotate tokens, and monitor development pipelines.